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I. INTRODUCTION 
In reviewing the literature dealing with alternative explanations 
of the term structure of interest rates, the ultimate purpose of this 
30-year debate is not always clear. The exchange often resembles an 
argument over whose theory is the "best" with little emphasis on why 
it really matters.^ 
Consideration of the role of interest rates in economic analysis 
elicits two critical questions. First, do the levels of interest rates 
exert an important influence on the level of economic activity; and 
second, what determines the levels of interest rates as well as the re­
lationships among them? The term structure literature directs itself 
to the second question. Two reasons may be cited for trying to explain 
the relationships among interest rates on debt instruments of differing 
maturities. One is to provide the best possible explanation of the 
term structure simply for the sake of providing an explanation. The 
other is to attempt to determine what factors, if any, affecting the 
term structure are under the control of the Federal Reserve System or 
the Treasury. In other words, can monetary policy and/or debt manage-
2 
ment influence the term structure of interest rates? The second 
purpose is often treated as an afterthought. 
^This criticism should not be viewed as applying only to the 
term structure literature. 
2 
We define debt management as any activity undertaken by the 
Treasury or the Federal Reserve which affects the maturity composition 
of the public debt. 
2 
The present study seeks to make the determination of the impact of 
policy on the term structure its central goal. We proceed from the 
basic premises that investors behave so as to maximize their returns 
and that their behavior is guided by what they expect interest rates 
to be in the future. It is, therefore, this profit-maximizing be­
havior based on expectations which determines the term structure of 
interest rates. The critical task, then, is to explain why expecta­
tions are what they are, with particular emphasis on the influence 
of monetary policy and debt management. The expectational horizon 
adopted for most of the investigation is one year, though some in­
formation is also provided for horizons of six months and two years. 
The study is presented in the following fashion. Chapter II pro­
vides a brief discussion of alternate theories of the term structure 
together with the results of some empirical investigations. Chapter 
III is directed to a summarization of two recent studies dealing with 
the determination of expectations. Chapter IV presents our theoretical 
and analytical framework together with our empirical results. The 
final chapter is devoted, as is customary, to summary and conclusions. 
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II. THE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS: A THEORY OF THE TERM 
STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
While there is considerable disagreement over the relative signifi­
cance of expectations in determining the term structure of interest 
rates, it is virtually impossible to find an explanation of the term 
structure that does not make reference to the role of expectations.^ 
Since the major purpose of this study is to explain why expectations are 
what they are, it is desirable that we first demonstrate that knowing 
what factors affect expectations is important to interest rate policy. 
For this reason we shall present the pure expectations hypothesis of 
the term structure of interest rates. We shall also look briefly at 
some modifications and justifications of this hypothesis. 
The purpose of undertaking this examination of past work in the 
area of the term structure is not to provide an exhaustive review of 
the literature. It is merely to establish that there is ample theoreti­
cal and empirical support for considering expectations, an important 
determinant of the term structure. 
The pure expectations hypothesis, usually associated with the name 
2 3 
of Friedrick Lutz, involves four basic assumptions, two which are be­
havioral and two which are institutional. 
^Even John M. Culbertson, perhaps the most ardent critic of ex-
pectational explanations of the term structure, has noted that ex­
pectations regarding the immediate future clearly affected the timing of 
rate adjustments (8, p. 131). 
2 
Much of this chapter draws on the work of Malkiel (33). 
3 
Lutz should not be viewed as the creator of this theory, since, as 
Malkiel argues (33, p. 17), elements of the theory may be found as far 
back as the works of J. B. Say. It was Lutz's (28) 1940 articulation of 
the theory which established the, association with his name. Luckett 
(27) makes a similar observation. 
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Behavioral Assumptions 
1. All investors perceive, with perfect certainty, a consistent 
set of expectations regarding short-term interest rates far into the 
future. 
2. All investors conduct their activities in the market solely 
to maximize profit. 
Institutional Assumptions 
3. Securities are identical in every respect except term to 
maturity and are riskless with respect to principal and interest. 
4. The cost to the investor of shifting from one maturity to 
another is zero, thus insuring unrestricted arbitrage. 
The critical implication of these assumptions is that all in-
4 
vestors will seek to equalize holding-period yields on different 
maturities of debt. The desire to equalize holding-period yield 
implies that, in the market, the rate of return on long-term securities 
will be equal to the georaetric mean of future expected short-term rates. 
Before formalizing the theory algebraically, a numerical example using 
simple interest should serve to clarify this relationship and thus the 
theory in general. 
Suppose an investor wishes to maximize his return on funds avail­
able for a period of 2 years. He is faced with two alternatives. He 
may purchase a two-year security or he may purchase two successive one-
4 Holding-period yield refers to the coupon rate plus or minus 
any rate of capital appreciation or depreciation caused by a change 
in the price of the security during the period the security is held. 
Equality of holding-period yield implies that arbitrage will guarantee 
an identical return regardless of the maturity of the security held. 
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year securities.^ If the current or spot-rate of return on a one-year 
security is 3% and the investor expects the rate of return on a similar 
security one year hence to be 5%, then to be consistent with the theory 
the spot-rate on a two-year security must be approximately 47„. If 
this is the case then the investor should be indifferent between the 
two alternatives. 
Let us now suppose that the rate on the two-year security is not 
equal to 4%. This will provide us with an example of how the market 
adjusts to equate holding-period yields. If the yield on the two-
year security is above 4% this investor, as well as other investors 
with a two-year investment horizon, will prefer the two-year security 
to two successive one-year securities. This activity will increase 
the demand and thus the price of the two-year security, at the same time 
decreasing the demand and price of one-year securities. Since security 
prices and yields move in opposite directions,^ the yield on two-year 
securities will fall while the yield on one-year securities will rise. 
The process continues until holding-period yields are equated. 
The equality of yields just described may be expressed in general 
as : 
^There is, of course, a third alternative. Our investor might 
purchase a security maturing beyond the two-year horizon and sell it 
at the end of two years. In this case the theory suggests that the 
market would equate the return on this security for the period with 
the returns from the two other options. The equilibrating process 
is essentially the same as that described between the returns for the 
other options. 
^For a proof of this relationship see Malkiel (33, p. 54). 
(2.1) p(i +«,)' = p(i Vi><i 
where the capital R's represent spot-rates and the small r^'s repre­
sent expected rates. The prescript indicates the time at which the 
rate is to apply. The first subscript designates the number of 
periods to maturity for that security. The second subscript appearing 
on expected rates indicates the time when the expectation is formed. 
Hence, ^^r^ designates the expectation at time t of the yield which 
will exist for a one-period security in period t44. P represents the 
size of the investment.^ 
Dividing Equation 2.1 by P and taking the n*"^ root of both sides 
we have 
(2.2) (1 = 1^(1 
or, that one plus the n year spot-rate is equal to the geometric mean 
g 
of one plus each of the expected one-period rates. 
An additional implication of the Expectation Hypothesis is that 
the current term structure forecasts a set of forward rates. These 
implicit rates derive from the relation: 
v.)" 
t n-1 
^This notation will be used throughout this study. 
^Note that s ^r^ . Also Equations 2.1 and 2.2 implicitly assume 
that all coupon payments are made at maturity. This is equivalent to 
assuming all coupon payments made during the life of the security can 
be reinvested at R . For an interesting criticism of this simplifying 
assumption, see A. Buse (5). 
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('^ 4) - 1 where 
^ is the forward rate on a one-period security which will apply 
at time t-hi-1. 
While this statement is essentially a mathematical tautology, 
the expections hypothesis gives it economic meaning by asserting that 
the forward rates implicit in the term structure are unbiased estimates 
of future expected rates (33, p. 22). In other words: 
ttn-1^1^, " t+n-1^1^, ' 
The Hicksian variation of the expectation hypothesis takes issue 
with this last assertion (19, pp. 144-47). Hicks argues that forward 
rates are upward-biased estimates of expected rates; biased upward 
by a liquidity premium. The rationale for the existence of the liquid­
ity premium derives from abandoning the assumption of perfect certainty 
and introducing the assumption that investors are risk avertors. 
Within an atmosphere of uncertainty about the level of future rates. 
Hicks asserts that any person entering into a long-term contract is 
placing himself in a risky position (19, p. 146). There are, however, 
certain borrowers with long-range capital needs who prefer long-term 
securities to insure the acquisition of this capital. In order to en­
courage lenders and speculators to enter into long contracts, borrowers 
must pay a risk or liquidity premium. The result of this premium is to 
biase forward rates upward so that they exceed expected rates. Alge­
braically r = r^ + P where r is the forward rate, r^ is the expected r£ 
and P is the liquidity premium. Thus, long rates "normally" lie above 
8 
short rates, producing an upward-sloping yield curve. A downward-
sloping yield curve would result only when short rates are expected to 
fall. The pure expectations hypothesis does not suggest any "normal" 
shape for the yield curve. 
Before turning to a review of empirical tests of expectations 
hypotheses, we shall look at one additional major theoretical 
contribution; the work of Burton Malkiel (31, 32, 33). Malkiel's 
contribution differs from the Hicks-Lutz theory in two important re­
spects. First, investor behavior is assumed to be guided by expecta­
tions regarding security prices rather than rates; and second, these 
expectations are formed about all securities one period into the future 
rather than about one period securities for an infinite time horizon 
(33, p. 50).^^ The critical similarity between the two approaches is 
" 9 
The yield curve is constructed by plotting spot-rates against the 
range of terms to maturity. 
^^The essentials of Malkiel's theory (33, pp. 50-81) may be pre­
sented by drawing on three theorems dealing with the mathematics of 
security price movements and the assumption that investors envision in­
terest rates moving within some "normal range" historically established. 
The three theorems stated here without proof are; 
1. Security prices move inversely to security yields. 
2. For a given charge in yield, changes in security prices 
are greater the longer the term to maturity of the 
security. 
3. The percentage changes in security prices increase at a 
decreasing rate as term to maturity increases. 
We shall describe here how Makiel is able to explain an upward-
sloping yield curve. We begin by supposing that the yield curve is 
constrained to a horizontal position below the middle of the "normal 
range" of rates. If the market is then freed, investors will feel that 
they h&ve more to fear than hope in terms of security price fluctua­
tions during the next period. (Remember, we are assuming a one-period 
horizon.) Within the "normal range," interest rates can rise more than 
they can fall; thus, by theorem 1, prices can fall more than they can 
rise. Further, by theorem 2, the price of long-term securities can 
fall more than the price of short-term (footnote continued on next page) 
9 
the assumption that the market equalizes holding-period yield over the 
investors' horizon. Indeed, Luckett has shown that this assumption is 
sufficient to demonstrate the two theories are mathematically equivalent, 
though they derive from very different behavioral assumptions (25, 
p. 323). Malkiel's theory, then, implies that the current term 
structure forecasts all rates which will apply one period hence. An 
algebraic expression for this implicit set of rates is 
1 
(Z'G) t+l\ 
(1  +  
n 
1 . 
(footnote continued from previous page) securities. Thus, in an attempt 
to minimize capital loss, investors will move out of longs and into 
shorts. This action will push down the price of longs and raise their 
yield while having the opposite effect on the price and yield of shorts. 
Hence, we have an upward-sloping yield curve. Theorem 3 guarantees that 
the yield curve tends to flatten out as term to maturity increases. 
This corresponds to empirical observation. Note that the yield curve 
obtains, without any explicit assumptions, about investors* expectations. 
The only expectation they held was that interest rates would continue to 
fluctuate within their normal range. They sought to equalize, over a 
short period, the expected value of potential price fluctuations for 
securities of different terms to maturity. Consequently, investors in 
effect estimated the expected value of the price of each security at the 
end of the horizon period (33, p. 74). A downward-sloping curve re­
sults when we begin our argument with rates near the upper end of the 
"normal range." The argument is completely analogous to the one 
just presented. In such a circumstance, potential fluctuation gives the 
investor more to hope than to fear. If no fluctuation is expected over 
the next period, a horizontal yield curve obtains. 
Introducing expectations proper in terms of the relative probabili­
ties that rates will rise or fall may effect the relative steepness of 
the yield curve, but will not alter the overall direction of the slope. 
The theory will readily accommodate additional assumptions regarding 
such things as tax and call features (33, p. 72). It is also adapt­
able to the Hicksian liquidity premium concept, a factor which will 
prove very useful in the empirical work of this study. 
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The Hedging Hypothesis 
In order to fully appreciate much of the empirical work dealing 
with the term structure, it is necessary to note an alternative to the 
expectations hypothesis. John Culbertson's (8) institutional or 
hedging hypothesis argues that the market is segmented; that there are 
distinct groups of borrowers and lenders in each end of the markets; 
and that short-term and long-term securities are not perfect sub­
stitutes. Since investors do not, therefore, move freely from one 
end of the market to the other, the major determinant of the term 
structure is not expectations but rather the relative supply of 
securities in each end of the market. The predominant objective of 
most recent empirical work has been to support or discredit one of 
these theories. 
Because it is unlikely that either theory contains the entire 
explanation of the term structure, it is critical to understand the policy 
implications of each. Clearly, the institutional hypothesis implies 
that Federal Reserve open-market operations and Treasury debt manage­
ment exert significant influence on the term structure. On the other 
hand, the pure expectations hypothesis suggests that if expectations 
are perfectly inelastic with respect to economic policy, the only pos­
sible channel through which policy might effect the term structure is 
through the one-period interest rate, R^. Each empirical test of the de­
terminants of the term structure then, at least implicitly, is a test of 
whether economic policy can alter the term structure significantly. 
11 
Empirical Evidence 
We now turn to a brief discussion of these empirical tests. We 
shall confine ourselves to the presentation of conclusions, with mini­
mal reference to analytical technique. Two qualifications should be 
noted at the outset. First, one can never prove an hypothesis 
statistically. He can only lend support to it by failing to reject it. 
Second, one cannot test "the" expectations hypothesis directly. He can 
only test his or someone else's formulation of the hypothesis (2, p. 62). 
Early formulations of the expectations hypothesis argued that if 
the theory were valid, the forward rate implied by the term structure, 
ex ante. ought to forecast future spot-rates accurately, ^  post. 
Culbertson (8) and Hickman (18) find this not to be the case and thus 
reject the hypothesis. Walker (53) and Macaulay (30), on the other hand, 
find what they consider to be adequate evidence of accurate forecasting; 
hence, they do not reject the hypothesis (22, pp. 7-10). Meiselman, 
however, correctly observes that the expectations hypothesis does not 
require that expectations be realized, only that anticipations determine 
the current rate structure (34, p. 12). 
Recognizing the validity of Meiselman's point, Kessel (22) and 
Wendel (55) argue that though forecasts may not be accurate, the ex­
pected value of forecasting errors over time ought to be zero. Their 
findings, however, contradict this hypothesis. The work of both men re­
veal a positive mean forecasting error. This positive residual they 
conclude is evidence of a liquidity premium, thus supporting the Hicksian 
version of the expectations hypothesis. 
12 
The error-learning model of David Meiselman (34) has been hailed 
by many as the strongest operational support for the expectations hy­
pothesis. Because this model has generated an impressive volume of 
literature, we shall look at it in some detail. Meiselman's contri­
bution does not concern the level of rates, but rather is concerned 
with changes in rates (34, p. 18). Specifically, the model seeks to 
show how expectations are revised given additional information; that in­
formation being the error made in forecasting the current one-period 
rate. Establishing this relationship provides an operational tie be­
tween unanticipated changes, the spot-rate and changes in expectations 
(34, pp. 30-31). 
The regression model which Meiselman fits with Durand's (11, 12, 13) 
data is : 
t+n^l " t+n^l = a + b (R - ^r ) , 
t t-1 t t-1 
where the dependent variable is the revision in expectations and the in­
dependent variable is the forecasting error. The results of testing the 
model for values of n ranging from 1 to 8 may be summarized as follows 
1. The correlation coefficients are relatively large,ranging 
from 0.95 for n = 1 to 0.59 for n = 8. 
2. The estimates of the b coefficients are positive and 
significantly different than zero. They decline from 0.70 for n = 1 to 
0.21 for n = 8. This decline in the size of the coefficients suggests 
that recent errors in forecasting exert a lessening impact as the horizon 
of the forecast increases. 
^^For a detailed presentation of the results, see Meiselman (34, 
pp. 21-30). 
13 
3. None of the estimates of the constant term, a, are significant 
ly different from zero. Meiselnan has observed that this result casts 
doubt on the existence of any liquidity premium. Both Kessel (22) and 
12 
Wood (56) have demonstrated that this observation is not valid. 
The comments, criticisms and coninendations dealing with Meiselman* 
work have been numerous and diverse. Grant (17), for example, fits 
Meiselman's model to British data, deriving his yield curves by inter­
polation rather than free-hand as Durand has done. Grant's results 
duplicate Meiselman's except that Grant's correlation coefficients are 
much smaller. Fisher (14) using the same British data as Grant but 
constructing his yield curves with a multiple regression technique, 
duplicates Meiselman's results in terms of the forecasting error co­
efficients and the correlation coefficients, but finds negative inter­
cepts significantly different from zero. 
— 
If we alter Meiselman's model to include the Hicksian specifica­
tion of forward rates, (i.e., that forward rates equal expected rates 
plus a liquidity premium) we have; 
W l »  
t t t-i t-i 
where the P's represent the liquidity premiums contained in the forward 
rates. Suppose now that no error is made in forecasting so that 
R, = r® . This implies that there will be no revision of ex-
t t-1 
pectations; hence, _ r. = ^. r. 
t-n 1^ t+n 1^ T 
t t-i 
Therefore, a = . - . . P, + b P^ . Clearly, a = 0 is 
t-m ij. t-m t 
a necessary condition to conclude that all liquidity premiums are zero, 
but it is certainly not a sufficient condition. 
14 
Bierwag and Grove (2) develop an adaptive error-learning model 
which allows for non-uniform expectations. They fit this model with 
Durand's data (11, 12, 13) as well as Grant's data. The correlation 
coefficients for the Durend data indicate an excellent fit but are 
rather disappointing for the Grant data» The authors thus conclude 
that the formulation of expectations in the United States and Britain 
13 
differ. 
Both James Van Home (51) and Neil Wallace (54), in fitting an 
error-learning model to Treasury data taken from smooth free-hand 
yield curves, generally duplicate Meiselman's results. However, they 
find a positive,significant intercept which implies the existence of a 
liquidity premium. Wallace argues that if such a premium exists in 
order to induce investors into one end of the market or the other, 
then the explanatory values of the model should be improved by adding 
some measure of the supply of debt of differing maturity. The result 
of adding such variables was disappointing. 
In evaluating Meiselman-type models, one should keep in mind two 
important criticisms. First, Luckett has shown that Meiselman's model 
cannot distinguish between the Lutz expectations hypothesis with its 
infinite horizon and the Malkiel theory which is based on a one-period 
horizon (25). A further and far-more devasting criticism comes from 
Buse (4, 6, 7) who argues that smooth yield curves are sufficient to 
give Meiselman-type results. Further, these results may merely reflect 
the empirical fact that short and long rates move together, with shorts 
more variable. This empirical fact, however, is not inconsistent with 
the expectations hypothesis. 
l^Buse (6) argues that this is not the case, but that the diverse re­
sults obtain from the fact that Grant's data do not provide smooth yield 
curves. 
15 
Several additional studies using differing analytical techniques 
and data reach conclusions which lend support to an expectational ex-
14 
planation of the term structure. John Wood, in an unpublished paper, 
concludes that the relationship among interest rates was better ex­
plained by expectations than by security supplies (33, p. 229). 
Similarly, Jacob B. Michaelson concludes "expectations about future 
short-term rates exert an important influence on the term structures" 
(35, p. 463). 
In 1967, Kane and Malkiel (21) conducted a survey of investors. 
The results of this survey provide important support for Malkiel's ex­
pectations hypothesis. The evidence indicates that investors are will­
ing to make short-term forecasts about long-term rates. While expecta­
tions do not appear to be uniform, they do effect the appraisal of the 
market. There is also evidence of the existence of liquidity premium 
as well as some security supply effects. Three studies which concentrate 
particularly on supply effects are the works of Scott (42), Okun (38) 
and de Leeuw (10). Scott, using the average maturity of marketable 
government debt as an independent variable, finds that indices of 
liquidity contribute significantly to explaining the variation between 
short and long rates. Okun and de Leeuw on the other hand, basing their 
explanations of rate differentials on the proportion of public debt in 
particular maturity classes, find very weak supply effects. 
The conclusions of Wood (56) are particularly relevant for our 
study. He concludes that expectations are elastic and that the yield 
curve can be affected if expectations respond to changes in the current 
14 
Wood, John. An econometric model of the term structure of in­
terest rates. Unpublished paper presented to the Econometric Society. 
1962. Cited in Malkiel (33, p. 229). 
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rate. Since we are concerned with the determinants of expectations 
and their implications for economic policy, it is critical that expecta­
tions are not completely inelastic. 
The recent work of Modigliani and Sutch (36, 37) and Taylor (45) 
shed additional light on the responsiveness of expectations to economic 
phenomenon, particularly past spot-rates. Modigliani and Sutch, in 
testing their preferred habitat model,define and measure the ex­
pected change in the long rate as a 16-quarter distributed lag of 
short rates. Expectations, however, never appear explicitly as a de­
pendent variable in their model. Taylor, fitting a similar model to the 
pegging period^^ during and following World War II, achieves a fit 
comparable to that of Modigliani and Sutchj'^though his lag structure 
^^The preferred habitat theory is essentially a hybrid, drawing on 
both the expectations theory and Culbertson's hedging hypothesis. The 
three distinguishing assumptions from which the theory derives are (a) 
future rates are uncertain, (b) borrowers and lenders have a distinct 
preference regarding the maturities they issue or hold (they have a pre­
ferred habitat) and (c) these transactors are risk-averse and are gen­
erally unwilling to accept the uncertainty of cost or income associated 
with moving to a non-preferred habitat unless some inducement (e.g., a 
liquidity premium) exists to compensate them for accepting the risk (36, 
p. 569). The model also allows for the existence of speculators. Thus, 
in such a world as the model describes the differential between short 
and long rates is determined by both expectations and the relative supply 
of securities of different maturities. It is this hypothesis which 
Modigliani and Sutch test. 
^^From March 1942 to March 1951, the Federal Reserve Open-Market 
Committee agreed to buy any and all government securities at par, thus 
effectively placing a ceiling on interest rates. 
Both studies exhibit correlation coefficients in a range from 
0.88 to 0.95. 
17 
is considerably different. Both studies find that the expectational 
model accounts for most of the variation in the term structure with 
little fluctuation remaining to be explained by security supplies. 
Taylor, however, finds evidence which indicates that supply effects may 
be found in the lag structure, thus implying that changes in the 
supply of debt may affect the term structure through expectations (45, 
p. 166). 
"The implication of recent empirical finding, although far from 
being one-sided, have shifted opinion toward either the 
pure expectations theory or this theory modified to include 
the existence of liquidity premium on long-term debt." (44, 
p. 15). 
In summarizing the current state of knowledge regarding the term 
structure, Telser clearly indicates the direction which further study 
must take. 
"The most challenging task for future research on the term 
structure of rates is the extension of the expectations model 
so as to incorporate the effects of other variables that might 
affect expectations in addition to the forecast error. In 
concrete terms, one ought to explain more of the changes in 
forward roles." (46, p. 560). 
We seek to provide this explanation. 
18 
III. ENDOGENOUS EXPECTATIONS 
We turn now to an examination of an empirical investigation which 
has specifically attempted to explain expectations. Luckett (24), in 
a study which is a forerunner to the present investigation, tests the 
Keynesian hypothesis of the existence of some "normal" rate of interest, 
at the same time explaining changes in expectations on the basis of 
monetary policy; namely, free reserves. Since this study relates 
directly to our current research, we shall look at it in some detail. 
Luckett's model is based on the theoretical work of Burton 
Malkiel (31) in that the expectations which are explained are for all 
rates one year into the future.^ The basic model derives from the 
postulate that expectations about next year's rates are a linear 
function of spot-rates. That is, 
(3.1) ^.^r^ = a + b^R where a and b are constants, a > 0 and 
t+i n^ t n 
0 < b < 1 if investors indeed expect rates to return to some norm. 
In order to obtain data to test the model, it was assumed that ex­
pectations are approximated by the forward rate implied by the term 
2 
structure, ala Malkiel. To avoid consideration of any constant liquid­
ity premium the dependent variable used in the final model was the 
expected change in the yield on an n period security over the one-year 
horizon defined as: 
^This is as opposed to Meiselman's error-learning model which deals 
with the expectation of short rates up to eight years into the future. 
I 
2, n 
That is, n+1 
e 1 t+l^n t+l^n 
t t 
19 
(3.2) E(A r,) . . 
To avoid having on both sides of the equation, it was assumed 
that the spot-rate was a function of monetary policy. The level of free 
reserves was used as a measure of that policy. Expressed linearly: 
(3.3) = c + d F 
where F is the level of free reserves and c and d are constants. It 
was assumed that c > o and d < 0. 
Combining the three equations above, we have: 
(3.4) E(û r^) = a + S F 
3 
where Of = (a + be - d) and 3 = (b - l)d . 
A time trend was also added to allow for possible changes in the 
"normal" rate or in the relationship between spot-rates or in the re­
lationship between spot-rates and free reserves. The final model which 
was tested was 
(3.5) E(A r^) = Q' + PF + 'YT 
where T is the trend and Y is a constant. The model was fitted with 
monthly yield data obtained from Kessel (22) for the periods January, 
1954 through November, 1962 for n = 1 - 5 and September, 1957 through 
November, 1962 for n = 1 - 9. The results appear in Table 3.1. 
Three important conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, 
all the g coefficients are positive and significantly different from 
zero; thus supporting the Keynesian hypothesis. Second, the correlation 
coefficients are relatively high, considering that the dependent variable 
is in the nature of a first difference. And finally, the size of the 
_ 
If the Keynesian hypothesis is valid, it was hypothesized 
that $ > 0. 
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Table 3.1. Effect of free reserves on I expected change in interest 
rates* 
Coefficient ofk 0 
n Constant F T R 
Panel A: l/'54 through 11/'62 
1 .511 .00039 -.001 .42 
(14.0) (8.7) (1.7) 
2 .317 .00041 -.0006 .65 
(13.3) (14.0) (1.5) 
3 .238 .00037 -.0007 .75 
(14.2) (17.9) (2.6) 
4 .199 .00033 -.0008 .80 
(14.8) (20.1) (3.9) 
5 .176 .00030 -.001 .81 
(15.3) (21.0) (5.3) 
Panel B: 9/'57 through 11/'62 
1 .566 .00041 -.0035 .32 
(10.4) (5.2) (2.1) 
2 .371 .00048 -.0030 .65 
(11.6) (10.3) (3.0) 
3 .249 .00041 -.0020 .77 
(12.0) (13.7) (3.1) 
4 .180 .00037 -.0015 .81 
(10.9) (15.3) (2.9) 
5 .151 .00032 -.0016 .82 
(10.9) (16.0) (3.7) 
6 .129 .00029 -.0015 .82 
(10.3) (15.9) (3.9) 
7 .116 .00026 -.0015 .84 
(10.9) (17.2) (4.6) 
8 .110 .00024 -.0017 .84 
(11.7) (17.6) (5.8) 
9 .112 .00023 -.0020 .74 
(9.3) (13.1) (5.5) 
^Source: Luckett (24, p. 188). 
The dependent variable is expressed as a percent, free reserves 
in millions of dollars. The figures in parentheses are the "t" 
statistic. 
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R 's is directly related to the maturity of the security. This tends 
to suggest some undefined independent variables.^ Is, for example, the 
assumption regarding constant liquidity premiums valid? This is one of 
the questions we seek to answer. 
We should also note a study by Helmut Wendel (55) which is similar 
in some respects. Like Luckett, he attempts to explain expectations 
and also to test the Keynesian normality hypothesis. The dependent 
variable which he uses is merely a more complicated transformation of 
the variable used by Luckett. The independent variable used to test the 
normality hypothesis is the percentage deviation of the current spot-rate 
from a distributed lag of past rates. His work lends support to this 
hypothesis, as does Luckett's. In addition, Wendel adds several measures 
of economic activity to his model in an attempt to better explain ex­
pectations. However, even with these added variables, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic remains too low to place much confidence in their significance. 
The primary goal of Wendel*s study is not to arrive at policy 
implications. Indeed, the only policy variable he includes in his model 
is treated in an appendix and with little success. His major purpose 
is to explain the formation of expectations in order "to evaluate whether 
expectations formulated in such a manner would explain changes in yield 
^We suspected that had a Durbin-Watson statistic been computed for this 
model, it would have been quite low, implying incomplete specification 
of the model. Fitting this model to Morgan Guaranty Trust Company data, 
we obtained results strikingly similar to Luckett's; however, we found 
the Durbin-Watson statistic to be in the range 0.58 to 0.87 confirming 
our suspicions. 
22 
spreads" (55, p. i). Within this context his study does lend further 
support to the expectations hypothesis. His work has also provided 
some suggestions which are further pursued in our study. In particular 
we are interested in determining the significance of the impact on ex­
pectations of a lagged index of industrial production, a variable used 
by Wendel, relative to the impact of policy variables. 
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IV. DETERMINANTS OF EXPECTATIONS 
In this chapter we shall present the findings of this study re­
garding determinants of interest rate expectations with particular 
emphasis on the impact of economic policy variables. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. In the first section we describe the 
variables and data used in developing and testing our model. In the 
second section we present the technique and results of testing the 
model within the context of a one-year horizon. The final section is 
devoted to testing the same model using a six-month and a two-year 
horizon to ascertain whether the impact of policy on expectations is 
markedly different for different investment horizons. Unless directly 
applicable to the current discussion of the final model, the presenta­
tion of alternative tests and analytical techniques is deferred to the 
appendix. 
Variables and Data 
Since we are concerned with explaining why expectations are what 
they are, we have selected as the dependent variable the level of ex­
pected interest rates. As a measure of these expected rates, we have 
used the forward rates implied by the current term structure.^ In 
particular, we have chosen the forward rates implied by Malkiel's formula­
tion since we are concerned with expectations about rates on all 
2 
maturities one period in the future. Our dependent variable is conse-
^This is, of course, consistent with both the expectational 
theories of Lutz (28) and Malkiel (31). 
2 
The length of this period is of course arbitrary. We will ex­
amine horizons of six months and two years in the final section of 
this chapter. 
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quently derived from the algebraic statement presented in chapter II and 
repeated here : 
iiljW 
(1 + 
1 
n 3 
- 1 . 
Data for the above computations were generously made available by 
Edward C. Fecht of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. The yields used were 
on marketable government securities for the period January, 1954 to 
January, 1968.^ 
While the pure expectations hypothesis implies forward rates are 
unbiased estimates of expected rates; i.e., r^ = r^ , we have noted in 
chapter II the possibility of the existence of a liquidity premium 
Q 
such that r^ = r^ + P^. In the two previously-mentioned studies of ex-
pfcctational determinants, it was assumed that any liquidity premiums 
3 
In this expression we have replaced the "1" used in chapter II 
to designate a one-period horizon with "i" to emphasize the fact that 
the horizon may vary in length. For example, with a one-year horizon 
i = 1, but for a six-month horizon i = 
4 
Each month the Morgan Guaranty staff compute a set of monthly 
averages of daily rates on securities of differing maturities. These 
averages are plotted on a graph where yield is measured on the vertical 
axis and term to maturity on the horizontal axis. Through this series 
of points, a smooth free-hand yield curve is drawn. It is from this 
yield curve that the rates used in this study were taken. The construc­
tion of such a yield curve is necessary since the expectations hypothesis 
requires knowledge of adjacent yields while in reality issues of every 
maturity do not exist. While it may be argued that this is a question­
able means of obtaining data, there are two redeeming features of the 
method. First, the same person constructed the curves throughout the 
period; and second, a different person took the yields used from the 
curves. 
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which might exist were constant over time. Our model provides a 
test for the existence of such a liquidity premium without making 
this assumption. 
The first independent variable we define is thus a measure of the 
liquidity of a security where liquidity is defined as "the ability to 
realize value in an accepted means of exchange" (52, p. 527).^ The 
principal determinants of the liquidity of a security are the 
fluctuation in its price and the length of time required to convert it 
to money. Since we are here concerned with government securities which 
are traded in a highly-organized market, the time factor is relatively 
unimportant. We thus adopt a measure of liquidity developed by Van 
Home and Bowers (52) which is based on the fluctuation in security 
price. "The liquidity o:: a Treasury security can be thought to re­
present the lower confidence limit with respect to the dispersion of 
market price around the mean price" (52, p. 528). Since security 
Luckett (24) incorporated this assumption into his model by using 
the quasi-first difference as a dependent variable. Wendel (55) follow­
ing Kessel's (22) reasoning that the mean forecasting error ought to be 
zero over time, argues that the average forward rate should correctly 
forecast the change in the spot rate. This implies that at the point in 
time when a forecast is formulated, that forecast should equal the exist­
ing spot rate plus the correctly-received change in spot rates plus any 
forecast error. If, over time, the mean forecast rate exceeds the mean 
spot rate plus the mean change in spot rates, then this excess represents 
a constant liquidity premium. Wendel finds this to be the case and thus 
estimates that liquidity premium which he proceeds to subtract from r^ 
to obtain r^ (55, p. 22). 
^See also Keynes (23), Tobin (47), Luckett (26) and Pierce (39), 
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price data are not as readily available as are rate data, the Van Horne-
Bovers liquidity measure draws on the inverse relationship between rates 
and prices. The measure is essentially the present value of the stream 
of returns from a security discounted by the rate of return adjusted for 
fluctuation. Specifically, the liquidity measure for an n period security 
is defined as: 
(4.2) L = E + — „ 
t=l (1 + + 3a^ ) (1 + + 3a^ ) 
n n 
where R is the mean yield over the past 12 months and o is the 
" *n 
standard deviation about this mean. Thus, the greater the fluctuation 
in rate, the smaller the liquidity measure and hence, the less 
liquid the security. If there exists a liquidity premium in forward 
rates we would expect the coefficient of to be negative. In other 
words, an inverse relationship between forward rates and the liquidity 
of a security is consistent with the hypothesis that forward rates 
contain a liquidity premium which is inversely related to the liquidity 
of that security. 
Having made allowance for the possibility of a liquidity element 
in forward rates, we turn now to a presentation of those independent 
variables used to explain the expectational element of forward rates. 
As noted by Wendel (55), there are two broad classes of factors which 
we might suppose influence expectations; those variables which measure 
the level of economic activity and those variables which represent 
economic policy. We do not, however, agree with Wendel's assertion that 
because these two classes of variables are correlated, "It is immaterial 
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in this context whether one views the short-term rate as being de­
termined predominantly by monetary policy, so that only policy has to be 
predicted, or whether one regards the vigor of domestic economic activity 
as the direct independent variable" (55, p. 19). Even though a model 
containing both types of variables is sure to contain multicollinearity, 
as long as the correlation between the variables is less than perfect 
and as long as one has reason to think that each variable makes a 
distinct contribution to expectations in its own right, it is both 
important and justifiable to consider their effects within the same 
model. 
The variables which we have chosen to represent economic activity 
and economic policy are: Q, the first difference of a distributed lag 
index of industrial production; DR, the discount rate; R , last 
"t-1/12 
7 * 
month's spot rate on an n period security; M, the time rate of change 
g 
of the Ng money stock; and D., the level of marketable debt outside 
J.V 9 
the Federal Reserve in the j debt class. It is clear some of these 
variables are correlated and this fact should be kept in mind In 
evaluating our results. 
The data for Q, the lagged Index of industrial production, were ob­
tained from the U. S. Department of Commerce publications (48, 49, 50) 
and represent the total index for all production, including utilities. 
^t-1/12 refers to last month and is consistent with t-1 which has 
been used to designate a point in time one year earlier. 
g 
The M„ money stock is defined as currency in circulation plus de­
mand deposits plus time deposits. 
9 
These variables were selected because of their significance and 
because of the consistency of their performance in several different 
models. 
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The lag covers the past six months. The lag structure used, beginning 
with the most recent month, was 0.300, 0.225, 0.175, 0.125, 0.100 and 
0.075.^° 
Values for M were also obtained from U. S. Department of Commerce 
data (48, 49, 50), while the discount rate data were obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin (3). Data for R was, of course, 
Vl/12 
taken from the Morgan Guaranty yields. 
Information regarding the maturity composition and ownership of the 
public debt was generously made available by Stephen Taylor of the Flow 
of Funds Section of the Federal Reserve System. By using the level 
of debt in a particular maturity class outside the Federal Reserve, we 
have a measure of any activity which influences the maturity composition 
of the debt. The activities of both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
are reflected in this variable. The Flow of Funds Section has divided 
the debt into four maturity classes—short, intermediate-short, inter­
mediate-long and long. It was this maturity breakdown that was used in 
this study. The short class Includes debt maturing within one year. 
The intermediate-short class contains securities of two- to four-year 
maturity. Debt maturing in six to eight years is classified as inter­
mediate long. Securities maturing beyond twelve years are considered 
long term. In order to facilitate smooth transition between classes as 
debt matures, the Federal Reserve has developed a weighting scheme to 
^^Wendel used a similar variable in his final model as sole measure 
of economic activity and policy. His lag structure, covering the past 
five months, was 1.000, 0.500, 0.250, 0.125 and 0.063 which place a much 
heavier weight on the recent past than our structure. 
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allocate issues of securities whose maturity places them between the 
classes we have described'. This scheme places a fraction of such 
issues in each of the adjacent classes. As the maturing process moves 
an issue closer to a particular class the larger the fraction of the 
issue allocated to that class. Our analysis deals wiLh expected 
rates one period hence for securities maturing in from one to nine and 
in nineteen years. This gives us at least one maturity corresponding 
to each debt class, thus enabling us to test the effect of debt supply 
on expectations. Clearly the one- and nineteen-year maturities cor­
respond to the short- and long-debt classes, respectively. Similarly, 
it is logical to suppose that the supply of intermediate long debt would 
effect expectations regarding six to nine-year maturities, while ex­
pectations about two- to four-year maturities would be most influenced 
by intermediate-short debt. Only the five-year security fails to cor­
respond, a priori. to a particular debt class. In preliminary analysis, 
the forward rate for a five-year maturity was regressed on the two 
intermediate classes separately. Comparing the two regressions revealed 
that the coefficient corresponding to the intermediate-short class was 
over twice as large as the intermediate-long coefficient.^^ It was thus 
concluded that if any significant debt supply effects were to be found 
on expectations about five-year maturities, they would come from changes 
in the intermediate-short class. 
11 2 
The R 's and Durbin-Watson statistics were too low to make any 
tests of significance meaningful, but this does not invalidate co­
efficient comparison. 
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The Model 
Using the variables we have just defined, the model with which we 
propose to explain expectations may be written as follows: 
(4.3) r = a + b L +cQ+dDR+cR +fM+gD. where 
n n "t-1/12 J 
a, b, c, d, e, f and g are constants, n = 1, 2, 9, 19 and j repre­
sents the short (S), intermediate short (IS), intermediate long (IL) and 
long (L) debt classes. 
The usual method for testing the above model would be to fit ten 
separate equations, one for each maturity with which we are concerned. 
This procedure, however, assumes these equations are independent, which 
they clearly are not. It further assumes that there is something to 
be gained from viewing the impact of the independent variables on each 
maturity expectation separately. Thus, for example, while it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the impact of a change in the discount rate 
might have a significantly-different impact on expectations about short-
term rates than on expectations about long-term rates, it is not clear 
that there is any information to be gained from comparing this impact on 
immediately-adjacent expectations. 
12 
In an attempt to provide statistically-more efficient coefficient 
estimates with stronger and more useful economic meaning, we have chosen 
to fit a single equation using Generalized Least Squares. We hasten to 
add that withour single equation we have allowed for differing effects 
on particular blocks of expecations by using a dummy variable type 
technique. For example, we are able to compare the impact of the discount 
_ 
An efficient estimator is defined as having minimum variance in 
large samples (1, p. 94-95). 
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rate on expectations about short rates (i.e., 1-5 year maturities) with 
the impact on expectations about long rates (i.e., 6-9 and 19-year 
maturities) and statistically test the significance of the difference. 
In order to clarify further we set forth the entire model in matrix 
notation. We will then explain the technique used to segment the inde­
pendent variables in order to achieve this comparison of effects on 
the dependent variable. 
* * * * * ' * * 
Let r,L,Q,DR,R,M and D, represent k x 1 vectors where k 
n n n j 
13 
denotes the number of sample observations. The final model may thus 
be written: 
13 
Note we have dropped the t-1/12 subscript from R to simplify 
notation. 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
DR 
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•i 
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•i 
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•f 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
R 
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* 
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* 
DR 0 
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* 
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• * 
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0 M 
•* 
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•* 
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•* 
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•* 
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0 
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IS 
IS 
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0 
0 
0 
IL 
IL 
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where I and 0 designate k x 1 vectors of I's and O's, respectively. Note 
that the subscripts on the coefficients correspond to the maturities to 
which the effect applies. For example, a^ refers to the intercept 
corresponding to expectations about maturities from 2-9 and 19 years. 
The form of this model was determined in the following manner. We 
first fit the model as ten separate equations. We then plotted the 
estimated coefficients together with their standard deviations for each 
of the six independent variables and the intercept. Where the co­
efficients were not markedly different and there was substantial overlap 
of their standard deviations, we concluded it was not reasonable to 
expect significantly different effects from these variables on these 
different maturities. Hence, we lumped sample values together to 
provide a single estimated coefficient for the block of maturities. 
Fitting this single equation model using Generalized Least Squares 
for the period January, 1954 to December, 1968, assuming a one-year 
14 
horizon, we obtain: 
(4.5) 
r = 0.141X, + 0.170(10"^)X„ - 0.136(lO"^)L, - 0.120(10'^)L„ _ 
n i z-iy i Z-7 
(3.95) (4.17) (3.72) (2.86) 
- 0.843(10"4)L^g + 0.105(10"^)Q^_^ + 0.592(10"^)Q^_^g 
(1.94) (9.70) (5.32) 
+ 0.296DR, ^ + 0.143DR. + 0.439R, , + 0.740R, 
1-5 6-19 1-5 6-19 
(11.76) (5.80) (18.53) (28.54) 
^^Note thst and are dummy variables. X^ = 1 when n = 1 
and zero otherwise, Xg =1 when n = 2, 3, ..., 9, 19 and zero 
otherwise. All rates used in this study are expressed in decimal 
form in hundredths rather than as a percentage. The rate of change of 
the Mg money stock is also expressed in decimal form in hundredths. 
Debt is expressed in millions of dollars. (Footnote continued on next page) 
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- 0.155(10"^)M + 0.536(10"^)M + 0.973(10'^)D„ 
(0.35) ^ (3.76) (4.42) 
+ 0.187(10'^)D + 0.218(10"7)DTT - 0.129(10"^)D 
(10.52) (1.27) (1.53) ^ 
= 0.993, Durbin-Watson = 1.725 
If the only goal of our analysis was to explain expectations for 
2 
the sake of an explanation, an adjusted R of 0.993 indicates our 
model has at least achieved this. At first glance, even the Durbin-
Watson (D-W) statistic of 1.725 would seem large enough to indicate no 
autocorrelation present in the residuals. We should, however, keep in 
mind that we are dealing with a sample of 1790 observation^^ so the 
D-W is probably^^ still in the indeterminant range. Nevertheless, 
it is doubtful that another G.L.S, transformation would add much re­
liability to our significance tests. A more important qualification is 
the probable existence of some correlation among the blocks of re-
(footnote continued from preceding page) The liquidity measure is the 
discounted present value of a $100.00 security, while the first difference 
of the distributed lag index of industrial production is expressed as a 
decimal in tenths. The subscripts on the variable designate the matur­
ities to which these coefficients apply. In the case of the debt class 
variables S corresponds t;o n = 1, IS to n = 2-5, IL to n = 6-19 and L to 
19. The absolute value of the t statistic appears in parentheses below 
the coefficients. For t ^ 1.96 the coefficients are significantly dif­
ferent from zero at the 0.05 level. All significance tests in the study 
are conducted at the 0.03 level. 
15 
While we started with 1800 observations, 10 were lost in the 
Generalized Least Squares (G.L.S.) transformation. 
^^It is impossible to say exactly because no D-W table exists for 
a sample as large as 1800 observations. 
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slduals which correspond to the various maturities. Two transformation 
techniques exist for dealing with this problem, one developed by Fuller 
(16) and another credited to Zellner (57). Both transformations should 
give similar results, but when each was applied to our G.L.S. model, 
the results were so diverse as to prevent our using either.We de­
cided to accept the results of the G.L.S. model because its coefficients 
were the most consistent, in terms of size, sign and significance, with 
the various other models we have tested, including Zellner and Fuller's 
transformations. One should, however, keep in mind the possibility of 
residual correlation in evaluating our results. 
Our preliminary analysis indicated the desirability of looking for 
significantly different effects from independent variables on expecta­
tion regarding particular segments of the yield curve rather than on in­
dividual maturities. One of the advantages of the single equation 
model is that it provides a simple method of testing for these dif­
ferences statistically (20, p. 132). For example, the model contains 
two intercepts—one applicable when n = 1 and the other applicable for 
all other n. Both intercepts are significantly different from zero and 
18 
significantly different from each other. 
The only explanation we can offer for the inconsistency of the two 
transformations is that presumably our data violates some assumptions of 
the techniques, but it is not clear how or why. 
18 
This model was also fit with one intercept corresponding to the 
period before the balance of payments became a serious policy issue and 
another corresponding to the period during which it was a serious issue. 
Interestingly, these two intercepts also proved to be significantly 
different. This provides some indication that overall policy during 
the period may have affected expectations. 
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The coefficients of the three liquidity measures provide support of 
the existence of a Hicksian liquidity premium. They are significantly 
different from each other; they have the hypothesized negative sign; 
and they decline as term to maturity increases. Two of the three, the 
one-year maturity coefficient and the two- to nine-year maturity group 
coefficients were significantly different from zero, while the non-
significance of the third coefficient indicates investors do not be­
lieve long-term securities contain a significant liquidity element. 
While these results are consistent with the findings of most of the 
19 
other models we tested, we did find some evidence to support the 
Preferred Habitat Theory (36, 37) of liquidity premium. The P.H.T. 
is that the premiums exist because of relative supply and demand in 
particular "habitats" (maturity sectors) rather than because there is 
20 
any "constitutional weakness" in the market. 
We have used as an indicator of the level of economic activity the 
first difference of the lagged index of industrial production pre­
viously described. We have sought to distinguish between its impact 
on expectations about short rates (n = 1, 5) vs. long rates ( n = 
6, ..., 9, 19). Both coefficients carry a positive sign and are 
significant. The influence on expectations about shorts is signifi­
cantly greater than on expectations about longs. This may be interpreted 
as indicating that investors expect the current trend in economic 
19 
See Appendix. 
20 
That is, borrowers prefer to borrow long; lenders prefer to 
lend short. 
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activity to continue, but place less reliance on its continuing for a 
long period. 
The model contains two variables which are relatively "pure" 
measures of economic policy, the discount rate and the level of debt 
in particular maturity classes. The effect of these variables is our 
major concern. 
As in the case of industrial production we have distinguished be­
tween the impact of the discount rate on expectations about short vs. 
long rates and found that impact to be significantly different. In 
both cases the influence is both significantly different from zero 
and positive, suggesting that a rise in the discount rate leads in­
vestors to believe interest rates will rise. The larger coefficient on 
DR^ ^ is consistent with the generally-held belief that the discount 
rate exerts a greater impact on short than on long-term rates. 
The effect of the debt variable is broken up in terms of the four 
maturity classes. If one hypothesizes that an increase in the supply 
of debt in a particular class, ceteris paribus, causes a decline in 
security prices and thus leads to expectations of rising rates, one 
would expect the sign of debt coefficients to be positive. The result­
ing estimated coefficients for the three shorter maturity classes lend 
support to this hypothesis. 
The level of debt in short-and intermediate-short classes was found 
to exert a significant influence on expectations about one year and 
two- to five-year maturities, respectively. The influence of the inter­
mediate-short debt is significantly larger than that of short debt. 
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Even so, this influence can hardly be considered great in absolute terms. 
According to our model, it would take an increase of approximately 
five billion dollars in intermediate-short debt to raise expectations 
about two to five-year rates by one basis point and nearly twice as 
much short debt for a similar effect on expectations about one-year 
rates. Neither the intermediate-long nor the long debt variables ex­
hibit any significant impact on expectations. And, in fact, the co­
efficient for the long class is negative. This may simply be an in­
dication that the Treasury has pursued a procyclical debt policy, 
issuing long-term debt only when interest rates are low and/or falling. 
This "wrong" sign is not a particularly critical result since this 
negative coefficient is not significantly different from the positive 
coefficient for the intermediate-long class. 
The rate of change in the money stock (M) may be viewed as 
something of a hybrid variable, since it may be strongly influenced 
by both monetary policy and the level of economic activity. It was 
included in the model because it is a frequently-mentioned economic 
indicator. It's contribution to explaining expectations is, however, 
questionable. While the coefficient on is positively signifi­
cant, it is not significantly different from the coefficient for which 
is negative and nonsignificant. There is no obvious explanation for 
this phenomenon. 
It remains for us to examine the justification for and the impact 
of including last month's spot rate in the model. By including this 
variable we immediately open ourselves to critics who would say we have 
21 provided a "boot strap" explanation of expectations. We are attempt­
ing to explain expectations which in turn explain the term structure, 
but expectations depend on spot rates. Hence, are we not caught in a 
circle? Further, is the lagged spot-rate not the major source of 
multicollinearity in the model? We make no attempt to deny that these 
two questions require an affirmative answer. What we do deny is that 
this affirmation is adequate justification for excluding the spot-rate. 
Our goal has been to explain expectations for the explicit purpose of 
determining the impact of economic policy. We have attempted to do this 
within as realistic a context as possible. We have included in our 
model those variables which possess the greatest intuitive appeal for 
providing a realistic explanation of expectations. One of those vari­
ables is certainly the level of rates in the recent past. While we 
are concerned with the effect of policy, we have never claimed that 
policy is the sole determinant of expectations. The impact of policy can 
only be realistically evaluated if it is viewed within a framework which 
includes the other important factors influencing expectations. It does 
not seem reasonable, therefore, to exclude the spot-rates from our model. 
In a sense the inclusion of the spot-rate "explains" nothing, yet 
few would deny that this rate is an important consideration as investors 
view the horizon. And, as Joan Robinson has said, "If the rate of in­
terest is hanging by its boot straps, so is the price of Picasso's 
paintings" (41, p. 19). While we have included in the appendix a model 
run without the lagged spot-rate for the unconvinced, we choose to place 
much more reliance on the policy implications of model presented here. 
_ . 
See for example Robertson (40). 
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The impact of last month's spot-rate has been evaluated in terms 
of its effect on expectations regarding short-term vs. long-term 
maturities. These effects were found to be positively significant and 
significantly different from each other. The greater influence of the 
spot-rate on expectations about long-term rates indicates that investors 
rely more heavily on extrapolation when forming forecasts about long-term 
rates, even if this forecast is only for one year. This is consistent 
with Kane and Malkiel's (21) finding investors more willing to make 
forecasts about long-term rates than short-term rates. 
For purposes of comparing relative impact we have computed mean 
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elasticities for the independent components of our model. These 
elasticities appear in Table 4.1. 
While the lagged spot-rate exerts the most important effect, as 
might be expected, the relative impact of the policy variables is quite 
encouraging. We might also call attention to the extreme importance of 
the liquidity element for the one-year maturity. 
Varying Horizon Lengths 
One question which permeates the term structure literature concerns 
23 horizon length. In it;: most general form the question involves making 
a choice between the infinite horizon of the Hicks-Lutz formulation and 
Malkiel's one-period horizon. Having chosen, largely on the basis of in-
22 
Mean elasticity i:} defined as; 
(Mean of independent variable) (Coefficient). 
(Mean of dependent variable ) 
23 
Taylor has presented an interesting theoretical framework which in­
tegrates expectations and a specific time horizon into the decision­
making process. This framework implies that the market behavior of in­
vestor and thus the term structure is critically influenced by both ex­
pectations and horizon (45, pp. 30-56). 
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Table 4.1. Mean elasticities of expected rates with respect to in­
dependent variables 
Variable Elasticity 
-3.372 
Lgg -0.291 
-0.200 
0.012 
96-19 0-007 
DR^_^ 0.246 
»*6-19 0.117 
0.407 
*6-19 0.727 
-0.002 
M2_ig 0.006 
Dg 0.161 
Dis 0.193 
Dil 0.014 
0.009 
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tuitive appeal, the one-period approach, the remaining question which 
faces us is how long is one period? All of the analysis to date has 
been within the context of a one-year horizon. While the work of Kane 
and Malkiel (21) provides some basis for this choice, it is by no means 
clear that one year is the "correct" or "true" horizon applicable to 
most investors. 
The study we have undertaken was not designed to provide an answer 
to the question of vrfiat is the "correct" horizon. However, in an 
attempt to determine what influence the length of the forecast period 
has on policy effects, we have estimated the same single equation G.L.S. 
model for a six-month and a two-year expectational horizon. The co­
efficients for these two horizons, together with the coefficients from 
the one-year horizon, appear in Table 4.2. An examination of policy in­
fluence within the context of three arbitrarily-selected horizons can 
scarcely be regarded as providing anything more than tentative implica­
tion regarding the effect of horizon length. The comments which follow 
should be evaluated with this in mind. 
If six months is the most relevant horizon for investors, then the 
coefficients of the model seem to suggest that policy variables in 
general exert a lesser influence than if the horizon were longer. The 
coefficients for the lagged spot-rate are considerably larger for the 
short horizon. This is consistent with a hypothesis that in forecasting 
rates for short periods, investors rely heavily on extrapolation from 
the recent past. 
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Table 4.2. Coefficients for varying expectational horizons^ 
6-Month Horizon 1-Year Horizon 2-Year Horizon^ 
Var iable^ Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
*1 
* 
0.130 
* 
0.141 
* 
0.212 
*2-19 
0.169(10"!)* 0.170(10"!)* 0.190(10"!)* 
h 
-2 * 
-0.127(10 -2 * -0.136(10 ) -2 * -0.206(10 ) 
^2-9 
-0.147(10"^)* -0.120(10"^)* -3 * -0.124(10 ^ ) 
\9 -0.121(10"^)* -0.843(10"^) 
Ql-5 
-2 * 
0.119(10 ) 0.105(10'^)* 0.111(10"^)* 
^6-19 
-3 * 
0.572(10 -3 * 0.592(10 ) -3 * 0.523(10 
0*1-5 0.164* 
* 
0.296 
* 
0.225 
»*6-19 0.571(10"!)* 0.140* 0.651(10"!)* 
0.391(10"^)* -7 * 0.973(10 ') -6 * 0.131(10 °) 
°IS 0.991(10"^)* 
-6 * 
0.187(10 ) 
-6 * 
0.214(10 °) 
°IL 0.238(10"^) 0.218(10"?) 0.353(10"?) 
-0.882(10"^) -0.129(10"*) 
"l 
-0.938(10"^) 0.155(10"!) 0.193(10"!) 
^2-19 
0.654(10"!)* 0.536(10"!)* 
* 
0.112 
*1-5 
* 
0.670 0.439* 0.436* 
*6-19 
0.870* 0.740* 
* 
0.752 
= 0.997 = 0.993 R^ = 0.994 
D.W.= 1.809 D.W.= 1.725 D.W.= 1.728 
Indicates significance at the 0.05 level. 
^Tbe two-year horizon does not contain data for nine and nineteen-
year maturities due to data limitations. 
^The form of the variables is as described in footnote 14, pages 
33-34. 
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The discount rate appears to be most potent as a policy tool if 
the "true" horizon is one year. For the two-year horizon, it ceases 
to exert a significant influence on expectations about long-term rates. 
Instead, the positive coefficient for the rate of change in the Mg 
money stock, as it applies to long-term securities, doubles in size. 
This development is of particular interest because it is consistent 
with Friedmanian monetary theory. 
Coefficients for the debt variables tend to suggest that the longer 
the horizon the greater the influence of debt on expectations. This 
may indicate that the effects of debt management are viewed by investors 
as being more permanent and far-reaching than monetary policy. 
Finally, a comparison of the liquidity coefficients for differing horizon 
yields several interesting observations. For example, the liquidity 
component in one-year forward rates becomes increasingly important as 
the horizon lengthens, whereas the liquidity of other maturities exerts 
its greatest influence for a six-month horizon. Indeed, even the nineteen' 
year security shows a significant liquidity element for the short horizon. 
These results are consistent with the fact that the prices of short-term 
securities fluctuate less than the prices of longer-term securities. 
Hence, over a long period, short-term maturities would be expected 
to be more liquid. Similarly, over a short horizon, when there is less 
time for price fluctuation, even very long maturities possess a liquid-
Stated very simply, Friedman argues that an increase in the rate 
of change of the money supply causes high interest rates in the future 
and vice versa. More explicitly, an increase in the rate of change of 
the money stock causes investors to adjust their asset portfolios. In­
itially this adjustment may take place in the financial markets forcing 
prices up and rates of return down. Portfolio adjustment spreads to 
the real sector with a lag of substantial (footnote continued next page) 
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ity component. The results of comparing coefficients for differing 
horizons lead us to conclude that some rather different policy and 
liquidity implications arise, depending on the length of the forecast 
period for which the investigation is conducted. As noted earlier, 
these results are tentative. To obtain more conclusive information re­
garding the influences of horizon, one would need to evaluate numerous 
alternative forecast periods. One method of obtaining this information 
might be to begin by evaluating a very short horizon, say one month, 
and then successively adding one month to the length of the horizon. 
Such an approach would provide greater continuity to the evaluation of 
policy effects over an increasing horizon. 
In the final analysis the determination of the "true" horizon is 
an empirical question which must be answered through further research be­
fore positive policy pronouncements can be made. 
(footnote continued from preceding page) duration, stimulating economic 
activity and increasing the demand for loanable funds. This increase in 
demand, in turn, pushes interest rates up (15, pp. 59-64). Thus a 
significant positive relationship between expectations two years hence 
and the rate of change in the money stock is consistent with this theory. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was begun and conducted on the premise that there is 
adequate empirical evidence to support the contention that expecta­
tions are an important determinant of the term structure of interest 
rate. Acceptance of this premise makes it of paramount importance to 
determine how expectations are formed if we wish to broaden our under­
standing of the term structure. Following the lead of Luckett (24) 
and Wendel (55), we have attempted to explain why expectations are what 
they are. The central goal of the investigation has been to examine the 
influence of monetary policy and debt management on expectation. The 
approach has been to seek policy effects within the context of a 
completely-specified model. That is, the influence of policy has been 
sought within a framework which contains, in addition to policy in­
dicators, additional variables which exert a major influence on ex­
pectations. This method should provide more meaningful implications 
than an approach which examines policy effects in isolation from the in­
fluence of other expectational determinants. 
Using the level of forward rates implied by the current term 
structure as proxies for expectations, we were also able to provide a 
test for the existence of a liquidity premium within forward rates. 
The method we have used to make allowance for this liquidity premium does 
not require the assumption made in previous studies that this premium 
is constant over time. The evidence which the analysis provides sup­
ports the hypothesis that forward rates contain a liquidity premium 
and are thus an upward biased estimate of expected rates. The results 
are, however, somewhat inconclusive regarding the distribution of the 
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premium with respect to maturity. The basic model presented in the 
text lends support to the Hicksian theory, while some alternative models 
tested suggest that a Preferred Habitat explanation may be applicable. 
Clearly, additional investigation is needed. 
In summarizing the findings of this study regarding the influence 
of economic policy on interest rate expectations, four observations are 
in order. The first and most general conclusion is that in every model 
tested in this study, regardless of the horizon used, monetary policy 
and debt management variables made a significant contribution to the 
determination of expectations. 
The second observation concerns the relative impact of policy 
variables within the context of a one-year horizon. A comparison of 
mean elasticities revealed the discount rate to be the most potent 
policy tool. Indeed, its relative influence also appears to exceed that 
of the lagged index of industrial production. The least potent and 
least dependable measure of policy seems to be the rate of change of 
the money stock. Not only do the mean elasticities indicate that its 
influence is relatively weak, but it is not clear that its contribution 
is statistically significant. 
The most interesting concluding comments deal with the differential 
effects of policy on expectations about differing maturities. There 
seems to be a clear indication that both the discount rate and the level 
of debt exert a significantly-greater influence on expectations about 
short-term rates than on expectations about long rates. In fact, the 
long and intermediate-long debt classes do not appear to exert any 
significant influence on expectation about long rates. While the absolute 
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impact of a change in the supply of short or intermediate-short debt 
is not large, the results we have obtained suggest that debt manage­
ment, if undertaken with enough vigor, can have a marked effect on ex­
pectations and hence, on the term structure. Similar implications de­
rive from the apparent differential effect of a change in the discount 
rate. 
The final observation which we wish to make deals with varying 
horizons. It would appear that the influence of policy depends to a 
considerable extent on just what constitutes the "true" horizon. If 
this "true" horizon is six months, indications are that the influence 
of policy is considerably less than if the horizon is longer. If the 
"true" horizon proves to be two years, our analysis has revealed an 
interesting implication regarding the validity of Friedmanian Monetary 
Theory. In point of fact, of course, different investors have different 
horizons. The issue then may not be so much what is the "true" horizon 
as what is the "dominant" horizon. Alternatively, obtaining the "true" 
horizon may necessitate constructing some sort of weighted average of the 
horizons of different investors. 
While the results of this study provide singificant evidence in 
support of the monetary f.uthorities ' ability to affect the term structure 
by influencing expectations, considerable additional research needs to 
be done before precise policy pronouncements can be made. In particular, 
we need additional information regarding the "true" or "dominant" 
horizon. Finally, it should be remembered that the results we have pre­
sented here possess validity only insofar as the model we have developed 
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is a reasonably-realistic specification of the major determinants of 
expectations. 
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APPENDIX 
Alternative Variables Tested 
As noted in Chapter IV, the variables used in the final model were 
selected because of the consistency of the results which their co­
efficients provided in a variety of empirical models. Given below is 
a list of alternative variables which were tested and rejected because 
of inconsistencies or lack of statistical significance. 
Liquidity 
1. Liquidity index based on the dispersion of rates over 
the past twenty-four months. 
Indicators of economic activity 
1. First difference of the index of industrial production. 
2. Five-month distributed index of industrial production 
using Wendel's (55) weights. 
3. Percentage change in consumer prices over the past years. 
Indicators of monetary policy 
1. Level of free reserves. 
2. Reserve requirement. 
3. Money stock (i.e., currency plus demand deposits). 
4. First difference of the money stock. 
5. First difference of the money stock (i.e., plus 
time deposits). 
Indicators of debt management 
1. First difference of the quantity of debt in the class. 
2. First difference of the quantity of debt in the class 
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held by the Federal Reserve. 
3. Percentage of the total marketable debt in the class. 
4, Percentage of debt in the class held by the Federal Reserve. 
Alternative Models Tested 
We have included in this section two additional one-year horizon 
models as a representation of the numerous alternative approaches 
tested. The first is a single equation G.L.S. model which excludes last 
month's spot-rate. The results from fitting this model appear below. 
Again the t values appear in parentheses below the coefficients.^ 
(A.l) 
r = 0.424(10"^)X + 0.412(10"^)X + 0.128(10"^) L 
" (0.01) ^ (6.30) ^ (0.20) ^ 
- 0.258(10"^)L„ „ - 0.147(10"^)L Q 
(3.77) (1.98) 
+ 0.943(10"3)q + 0.758(10"3)Q + 0.506DR 
(6.99) (5.56) ^ (20.59)"^ 
+ 0.602DR^ 
O- Ly 
(30.02) 
+ 0.136(10"^)D + 0.178(10"^)D + 0.128(10"^)D 
(3.87) ^ (6.53) (4.43) 
- 0.281(10'^)D - 0.552(10"^)M + 0.572(10"^)M 
(1.87) (1.19) ^ (0.37) 
_ 2 
R = 0.962 D-W = 1.454 
^The form of the variables is as described in footnote 14, 
pages 33-34. 
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The coefficients for this model differ from the model presented in 
the text in several respects. First, one of the intercepts is no longer 
significant. Second, the one-year maturity liquidity coefficient shifts 
from negative significant to positive nonsignificance. Third, the in­
fluence of the discount rate shows a marked increase, particularly in its 
impact on long-term maturities. Finally, the intermediate-long debt 
class now provides a positive and significant contribution to expectations. 
Certain other differences may be noted as well. For example, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is low enough to suggest that a good deal of auto­
correlation exists in the residual. Clearly the inclusion of the lagged 
spot-rate eliminates much of this autocorrelation. This is another 
argument in favor of its inclusion. We reiterate our conclusion of 
Chapter IV. A model which seeks to explain expectations but excludes 
spot-rates is incompletely specified and thus less believable than the 
model used in the text. Even so, the model we have just presented does 
not contradict the basic conclusion that the level of the two short-term 
debt classes and the discount rate have a significant effect on ex­
pectations . 
The second model we present here involves the fitting of ten 
separate equations, one for each maturity. We have regressed r^ on the 
same variables as in the single equation model with the exception that 
we have excluded M. One other difference is that the data used covers 
the period May, 1952 to Eecember, 1968 instead of January, 1954 to 
2 
December, 1968. The estimated coefficients for these ten equations 
2 
The 1952-53 data was not used in the single equation model because 
of computer program constraints.-
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appear in Table A.l. 
Again, the results of this model do not contradict the general con­
clusions of the single equation model presented in the text. Policy 
variables continue to exert a significant influence on expectation. 
There are, however, three noteworthy differences between this 
model and the single equation model of the text. First, the liquidity 
coefficients in this model lend support to the Preferred Habitat rather 
than the Hicksian Theory. The nonsignlficance of the liquidity co­
efficients for maturities of two to five years might be interpreted as 
indicating that the quantity of debt in these maturity classes exceeds 
the quantity demanded by investors with two to five-year habitats. The 
fact that the intermediate-short debt class contains the largest pro­
portion of marketable debt is consistent with this conclusion. 
Another interesting result of this model is that the impact of 
the discount rate is not significant for expectations about longer-
term maturities. This is, of course, not inconsistent with our earlier 
results which seemed to indicate that a change in the discount rate 
exerts a greater effect on expectations about short rates than on ex­
pectations about long rates. 
The final point which we wish to make regarding this model is to 
call attention to the nonsignificance of the short debt class and the 
significance of the intermediate-long class. Since in several alterna­
tive single equation models the intermediate debt has bordered on 
significance at the 0.05 level, the results presented here are not sur­
prising. The nonsignificance of the short class has also appeared be­
fore. We are thus lead to conclude that the effect of these two classes 
Table A.l. Ten-equation model 
Vari­
ables^ Intercept L 
n 
Coefficients^ 
Q DR Y *"t-l/12 R^ D-W 
0.712(10"^ 
* 
-0.160(10"^ 
* 
-2 * 
0.113(10 ) 0.347* 0.351(10" 7 0.516* 0. 886 1. 636 
^2 
0.210(10"^ 
* 
-0.411(10"^ -2 * 0.103(10 ) 0.338* 0.190(10" 6 
* 0.447* 0. 905 1. 636 
^3 
0.161(10"^ 
* 
-0.302(10"^ 0.843(10"^)* 
* 
0.278 0.167(10" 6 
* * 
0.511 0. 911 1. 672 
^4 
0.131(10"^ 
* 
-0.227(10'^ -3 * 0.787(10 ) 0.249* 0.140(10" 6 
* * 
0.552 0. 917 1. 679 
^5 
0.106(10"! 
* 
-0.163(10"^ -3 * 0.733(10 ")) 0.202* 0.114(10" 6 
* * 
0.612 0. 924 1. 673 
^6 
0.179(10"! 
* 
-0.257(10"^ 
* 
0.481(10"^)* 0.915(10"!) 0.600(10" 7 
* 
0.797* 0. 944 1. 708 
0.153(10"! 
* 
-0.204(10"^ 
* 
-3 * 
0.426(10 0.553(10"!) 0.571(10" 7 
* 
0.840* 0. 951 1. 728 
0.123(10"! 
* 
-0.153(10"^ 
* 
-3 * 
0.371(10 ) 0.258(10"!) 0.517(10" 7 
* 
0.879* 0. 956 1. 743 
^9 
0.106(10"! 
* 
-0.126(10'^ 
* 
0.325(10"3)* 0.782(10"^) 0.454(10" 7 
* * 
0.904 0. 960 1. 767 
^19 
0.411(10"^ 
* 
-0.142(10'^ -3 * 0.258(10 ) -0.213(10"!) -0.650(10" 7 0.967* 0. 977 1. 808 
Indicates significance at the o.05 level. 
The level of debt in the short class is used in the first equation, the level in the 
intermediate short class in equations two through five, the level of intermediate-long in 
equations six through nine, and the level of long for n = 19. 
^The form of the variables is as described in footnote 14, pages 33-34. 
61 
is questionable. We add, however, that multiple equation models which 
assume that the equations are unrelated, when in fact they are not, 
provide less reliable results than the single equation approach. 
